

MORE MOBILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT!

Policy Coherence for Development in practice:
making the EU Mobility Partnership a tool for
development in Cape Verde

Linde-Kee van Stokkum
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AN INITIATIVE OF THE FOUNDATION MAX VAN DER STOEL

The Foundation Max van der Stoel (FMS) is a political foundation affiliated with the Dutch Labour Party. The vision of this foundation stems from a social-democratic background with international solidarity as its mission. The FMS believes that the voice of people in developing countries should resound in Dutch and European politics. In order to put development cooperation on the top of the political agenda, the FMS advocates fair Dutch and European politics and organises political debates and public events on international solidarity.

This study has been conducted as part of the FMS Fair Politics advocacy programme. Fair Politics focuses on the promotion of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) in Dutch and European policies. This way they hope to encourage further development of developing countries. Fair Politics runs a permanent political campaign to make politicians and policy makers aware of unfair policies, provide policy recommendations, and stimulate revisions of these policies. This is done following the belief that it is not fair to give with one hand and take with the other.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| ADEI | Agency for the Development of Enterprises and Innovation |
| CAMM | Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility |
| CAMPO | Centre for Migrant Support in the Origin Country |
| CVC | Common Visa Centre |
| DIAS de Cape Verde | Diaspora for the Development of Cape Verde |
| DGI | Directorate General for Immigration |
| EC | European Commission |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ENED | National Strategy for Emigration and Development |
| EU | European Union |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| FMS | Foundation Max van der Stoel |
| GAM | Global Approach to Migration |
| GAMM | Global Approach to Migration and Mobility |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| IIAG | Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance |
| INECV | National Institute for Statistics of Cape Verde |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| LDC | Least Developed Country |
| MDC | Ministry for Communities |
| MIC | Middle Income Country |
| MIREX | Ministry for External Relations |
| MpD | Movement for Democracy |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OMCV | Organisation for Women in Cape Verde |
| PAICV | Independence for Cape Verde Party |
| PCD | Policy Coherence for Development |
| SDG's | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SNIAAC | National Identification and Civil Authentication System |

PREFACE

Almost every day boats depart in an attempt to bring new people to the European shores; where they hope to find a place to live in peace, to explore their opportunities, to find jobs, and to lead a better life. Migrants like refugees from Syria or ‘fortune hunters’ from Senegal or Ghana are trying to reach the European shores in rickety boats. They risk their lives in order to escape from political prosecution, war, and poverty or to find family reunification, entrepreneurship, and education.¹ The great number of migrants and the shocking tragedies raise the question of how to deal with irregular migration and how to explore opportunities for regular migration and mobility.

In the framework of its Fair Politics (advocacy) programme, the Foundation Max van der Stoel (FMS) conducted the impact study lying in front of you. Fair Politics aims to enhance Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) by making politicians and policy makers aware of more FAIR policies: which do not hinder, but encourage further development of developing countries. Migration is one of the five PCD priorities as set by the European Commission (EC), yet remains an underexposed topic. Next to that, the links between migration and development seem obvious. How can we use migration for development?

In this impact study we have reflected on one of the few actual policies in place in the area of migration and development: namely the EU Mobility Partnerships. Cape Verde was an evident choice while it was the first country to sign a Mobility Partnership with the EU and while it has been a country where migration has played a crucial role for its development.

Cape Verde offers a great example of how migration can work for development. Emigration and emigrants have been vital for the development of the country. In contrast to the negative connotation of migration in Europe, Cape Verdeans approach migration and mobility as something positive. In line with this tradition, Cape Verde signed an EU Mobility Partnership in 2008. The Mobility Partnerships are the most concrete policy tool in the field of bilateral migration cooperation with third countries. Theoretically, it addresses the creation of more synergy between migration and development. In order to understand the practical impact of this framework on the development of its partner countries as well, this study examines the impact of the Mobility Partnership on Cape Verde's development.

The goal of this publication, and of the Foundation Max van der Stoel, is to contribute to the creation of a dialogue among policy makers and civil society: a dialogue on how migration can aid development and if and how the Mobility Partnerships can serve this goal. We hope that you will be inspired by this publication and will act fiercely to make development work!

Manuela Monteiro

president Foundation Max van der Stoel

Arjen Berkvens

director Foundation Max van der Stoel

¹ European Commission (2015), A European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In response to the increasing urge for a solution to the migration crisis in the Mediterranean, this research explores the impact of the European Union (EU) external migration policy in a developing country from a perspective of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). To this end the research takes on a three-pronged approach: 1) establishing a causality chain between the EU Mobility Partnerships, as most concrete policy tool of the EU's external migration policy, and impacts on Cape Verde; 2) analysing these impacts in line with their development implication, mainly registering how migration can contribute to development; 3) reviewing the policy efforts of both the Cape Verdean government and the European Union to address these impacts.

The EU has committed itself to ensure that its policies do not undermine development cooperation objectives or PCD. However, measuring the impact of incoherent policies is identified by the EU as a key challenge. This report analyses the development impact of the EU's Mobility Partnerships in Cape Verde. It seeks to contribute to the debate on how to establish regular pathways, and thus how to create more mobility for further development of developing countries.

Due to increasing migration flows towards EU territory and the recognition of migration as a powerful vehicle for boosting development, the *migration-development nexus* increasingly won importance in EU migration policies. This so-called nexus implies four areas of activities: including remittances, diaspora engagements, circular migration and brain circulation, and the negative effects of brain drain.

Build on these implications, the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) was established in 2005 and upgraded to the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in 2011. Over time the GAMM became the overarching framework for EU external migration policies. Within the European Union's external migration policies, the concept of Mobility Partnerships (2008) is the most concrete policy tool. As bilateral cooperation framework on migration issues, the Mobility Partnerships aimed to improve regular migration with third countries. Next to that, the Partnerships aimed to create more coherence between EU migration and development policies. However, the Partnerships suffered from a significant limitation before the first Partnership was signed: the lack of a financial support structure.

As one of the first partner countries, Cape Verde is characterized by a great emigration tradition. Partly due to the country's high economic fragility, the role between migration and development is undeniable. Remittances and FDI have played and still play a significant role for The country's. Cape Verde emigration tradition and the importance of remittances and FDI affected Cape Verde's decision to sign an EU Mobility Partnership as the first and only African country. The government of Cape

Verde still embraces mobility as an engine for the country's development. Currently, the EU Mobility Partnership is the best instrument Cape Verde has to achieve this mobility. On the other hand a problem arises in practice, because actions on regular (labour) migration are not compatible with actions addressing the flows of irregular migration in the Mobility Partnership. A closer look at the Mobility Partnership projects shows a main focus on strengthening border control and migration management with a remarkably low representation of development goals. Additionally, the idea of the predominance of migration control elements is enhanced by the judicial agreements of the Partnership: the visa facilitation agreement and the readmission agreement. Thereby, Cape Verde fulfils the eligibility criteria of its geographically position along the migration routes towards the European Union. The country also shows readiness to make significant efforts to fight irregular migration.

The former makes it appear that the EU Mobility Partnerships mainly functions as a European instrument to fight irregular migration flows towards EU territory instead of an instrument utilising migration for the development of its partner countries.

Thus reform of the concept of the EU Mobility Partnerships is crucial. The EU should take responsibility. The EU has to ensure that the Mobility Partnership is not only an instrument to fight irregular migration, but also an instrument to use migration for development. First of all, the EU has to increase the significance of the Partnerships by introducing a financial support structure. Secondly, the EU should extend regular migration and mobility opportunities for partner country nationals. Finally, the EU should further elaborate the engagement of partner country's diaspora in the development of the particular partner country. Within this scope, remittances should play a more prominent role. These recommendations are necessary if the EU wants to address the consequences of EU legislation on poverty eradication in developing countries.



1. INTRODUCTION

Throughout history there have always been human migrations from one place to another. However, there have never been as many people on the move as currently are: the United Nations consider 232 million people across the world as international migrants.² Attributes like globalisation, conflicts, changing economic, and social structures have increased people's tendency to travel to, what they consider as, better places. The European Union (EU) is often considered as a better place, and so has become one of the popular destinations. Migrants try to reach the EU for different reasons and through different channels: They look for regular pathways, but also risk their lives in irregular ways. The visibility of irregular channels recently increased in particular. Mainly, because of the extensive media attention on the shocking plight of thousands of migrants putting their lives in peril to cross the Mediterranean Sea.

In response to the human tragedy in the Mediterranean and the structural limitations of the current EU migration policy, the European Commission (EC) soon published its new Agenda on Migration on 13 May 2015. This Agenda combines the different steps the EU should take in this field: now, and in the coming years. The Agenda acknowledges the steps the EU needs to take to promote a coherent and comprehensive approach to reap the benefits and address the challenges deriving from migration.³

For example, the European Commission proposes the establishment of a new European policy on regular migration as a part of the Agenda's long term aim to improve the management of migration. The idea is that 'a framework for irregular pathways to enter in the EU will reduce push factors towards irregular entrance and stay'. Within the scope of this new EU regular migration policy, the Commission also intends to address the importance of harnessing the positive effects of migration for the development of countries of origin. Their efforts complement the work of the EU's Mobility Partnerships, the most elaborated bilateral cooperation frameworks in the field of migration.⁴

Since the 2000's, regular migration and mobility increasingly became acknowledged as potential powerful instruments to stimulate development in countries of origin. Additionally labour migration plays an important role in stimulating economic development in destination countries. According to the new EU Agenda on Migration, the EU's working age population is expected to decline by 17.5 million in the

2 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2013), International Migration Report 2013.
 3 European Commission (2015), A European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final.
 4 European Commission (2015), The European Agenda on Migration: Glossary, facts and figures.
 5 European Commission (2015), A European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final.

next decade.⁵ This study contributes to the discussion trying to answer the question of how regular migration and mobility can aid development. Within this scope, the facilitation of regular and safe migration and mobility plays a major role. Regular migration and mobility should underlie the implementation of a well-organised EU migration policy. Adaptation of former knowledge is in line with the Commission's proposal for a new EU policy on regular migration and anticipates on the shortly to be adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDG's) and the urge to include migration-related targets in these SDG's.

Since 2007, *Policy Coherence for Development* (PCD) lies anchored in the Lisbon Treaty. In order to actualise and concretise the European agenda for PCD, the European Council for Foreign Affairs identified five PCD priorities in 2009. One of these focused especially on creating more coherence between migration and development policies. Successful migration policy requires a strong development perspective. It requires a statement regarding the position of the EU Foreign Affairs Council. A good migration policy would ensure that not only the European destination countries benefit. It would also contribute to the development of developing countries. However, the increased attention for a link between migration and development policies has not lead to concrete results yet. This impact study focuses on regular migration from developing countries, in order to highlight the importance of policy coherence in the field of migration and development. The study aspires to contribute to a long-term answer to the migration crisis in the Mediterranean.

In 2008 Cape Verde was one of the first countries that signed a Mobility Partnership with the EU. As most elaborated bilateral cooperation framework in the field of migration, the Mobility Partnerships aim to facilitate regular migration between the EU and third countries and simultaneously aim to strengthen the link between migration and development policies within the EU's external migration policy. This study focuses on the impact of the EU Mobility Partnership on Cape Verde, in the context of the contribution of migration to the development of developing countries.. The results of this study accompanied by the policy recommendations can feed into the upcoming debate. This debate will try to come to terms on how to establish regular migration pathways and how to create more mobility for further development of developing countries.

The report structure is as follows: Chapter 2 explains the methodology used in this report. The following chapters explain migration and development as a PCD theme and EU policy on migration and development (chapter 3) and the implication of migration and development in Cape Verde (chapter 4). Chapter 5 offers an examination of the impact of the Partnership on the development of Cape Verde. The report concludes with an overview of the key findings and a set of policy recommendations.

2. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHODS

The overall purpose of this research is to explore the impact of the European Union's (EU) external migration policy in a developing country from the perspective of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). To this end, the research takes on a three-pronged approach: 1) establishing a causality chain between the EU Mobility Partnerships, as most concrete policy tool of the EU's external migration policy, and its impacts on Cape Verde; 2) analysing these impacts for their development implication, mainly taking note of ways in which migration can contribute to development; 3) reviewing the policy efforts of both the Cape Verdean government and the European Union to address these impacts.

A qualitative case study approach is applied in which the impacts of the EU external migration policy are assessed in one specific developing country through desk-based research of relevant literature and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the country. A case study approach enables in-depth assessment of the development impacts of EU external migration policy and allows for an appreciation of the heterogeneity and complexity of these impacts. This method also serves to highlight the perceptions and experiences of various stakeholders, for example affected people and policymakers of these development impacts. When using a case study, caution must be exercised in generalising the findings of the study, because impacts and experiences can vary from one country to the next. This approach however does allow for an analysis and illustration of broader problems in order to formulate policy recommendations which can be applied in a more general way.

The case selected for this study would need to be a developing country, a EU partner country and should have a focus on migration and development. The Republic of Cape Verde fits these selection criteria. Though there is much attention for PCD, the approach of this research - migration and development - is relatively underexposed in other researches. Little to no research has been done on the impact of the EU Mobility Partnership in Cape Verde. This report seeks to limit the underexposure of research in this context. The study was carried out over the period of September 2014 to May 2015, with four weeks of fieldwork in Cape Verde conducted in February 2015.

The study draws on the results of 27 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in Cape Verde, desk-based research, and a literature review. Representatives of different disciplines were interviewed with partial assistance of a translator. Representatives from civil society and non-governmental organisations (N=6), from various ministries of the government of Cape Verde (N=9), from other government institutions (N=6), from EU or member states representations (N=5), as well as an academic (N=1).

SUELY RAMOS NEVES

project officer at the International Organization for Migration (IOM), remigrant from the United States of America, 31 years old

Inspired by the potential of her country of origin, Suely Neves left her new country, the United States of America, to permanently return to her country of origin at the age of 26 years.

Ms. Neves left Cape Verde when she was 12 years old. Her mother took her and her two sisters to Boston to seek a better life. In 2001 she visited her father in Cape Verde and she was triggered by the country's election process. This made her look at Cape Verde in a different way than before. *'I noticed a lot of potential in the country, but also a lot to be done. So, I decided to contribute to the development of this potential and changed my major into Political Science'*. In the summer of 2009, Ms. Neves returned to Cape Verde, at the same age her mother left Cape Verde to Boston.

In the US, the Cape Verdean diaspora held a continuous discussion about how to bridge the gap between the Cape Verdeans in the US and Cape Verdeans in Cape Verde. Though everybody has Cape Verdean roots, there appear to be many culture differences. Ms. Neves aimed to become a bridge herself. She started on the individual level, by supporting the Cape Verdean study alliance of her former University (of Massachusetts Amherst) to organize a volunteer's week in Cape Verde. Working at the IOM in Praia, she has been able to lift this initiative to an institutional level.

Furthermore, she established her own sports association in Cape Verde 'Seeds of the Revolution' with the aim to use sports for development. This association brings Cape Verdean female basketball players from the US to Cape Verde to organise summer basketball camps for young Cape Verdean girls. Ms. Neves hopes that her sports association will contribute to a new political movement: a political movement that uses sports in a strategic way, in order to contribute to the development of Cape Verde.



3. EU POLICY ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

In 2006 the EU included its objective to take into account developing countries' interests in non-aid policies in its constitutional framework, through Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty. In the 2009 Council Conclusions⁶ the EU agreed to actively promote Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) in five priority areas: trade and finance; addressing climate change; ensuring global food security; making migration work for development; and strengthening the links and synergies between security and development. This chapter describes the ways in which the EU has sought to address PCD in its external migration policy.

3.1 MIGRATION DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Due to increasing migration flows towards EU territory and the recognition of migration as a powerful vehicle for boosting development the *migration-development nexus* increasingly has won importance in the EU's migration policies. The 2002 European Commission's (EC) Communication *Integrating migration issues in the European Union's relations with third countries*⁷ constituted its first attempt to clarify the links between migration and development. This effort can be seen in suggestions of several initiatives and in the promotion of coherence between both policy areas. The EC started addressing ways to improve the impact of migration on development, pressured by the 'external shock' provoked by the events at the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla in September/October 2005.⁸ After this the Commission published the 2005 EC Communication *Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations*.⁹ This communication identified four areas of activities: facilitate the flows of remittances; engage diaspora in their home country development; promote circular migration and brain circulation; and mitigate the negative effects of brain drain.¹⁰

Within the *migration-development nexus*, **remittances** have become the centre of attention.¹¹ According to the 2011 EC's Communication *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*¹² human mobility generates several forms of remittances:

6 European Commission, Policy Coherence for Development, via: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/policy-coherence-development_en [accessed 19 March 2015].

7 European Commission (2002), *Integrating migration issues in the European Union's relations with third countries*, COM (2002) 703.

8 During September and October 2005, hundreds of African immigrants stormed the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco. These attempts were harshly suppressed by Moroccan and Spanish border guards and resulted in several deaths at the border.

9 European Commission (2005), *Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations*, COM (2005) 390.

10 Sandra Lavenex & Rahel Kunz (2008), 'The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations', *Journal of European Integration*.

11 Ibid.

12 Council of the European Union (2011), *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*, SEC (2011) 1353.

financial remittances (money transfers and goods), social remittances (networks that facilitate flows of information, skills, and financial resources) and human remittances (skills and knowledge).

Furthermore, the concept of **diaspora** is increasingly recognized as an important potential actor in the development of countries of origin.¹³ The return of migrants, even temporary, can play a useful role in fostering the transfer of skills and can stimulate other forms of brain circulation. **Brain circulation** is seen as the transfer of knowledge and experience of emigrants to their country of origin. It usually takes place when they return to their home land after a period of emigration. Facilitating **circular migration** could probably also be useful in this respect. Circular migration encompasses temporary activities (business, professional, voluntary or other) of EU migrants in their country of origin and also focuses on temporary activities (work or study) of third countries nationals in the EU.¹⁴

Finally, the framework of the migration-development nexus addresses the fight against the negative effects of **brain drain** for developing countries.¹⁵

3.2 GLOBAL APPROACH TO MIGRATION AND MOBILITY (GAMM)

Building on the EC's Communications about the implication of the *migration-development nexus*, the European Council adopted the *Global Approach to Migration: priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean*¹⁶ in 2005. Throughout the years, this Global Approach for Migration (GAM) became the overarching framework for the EU external migration policy.¹⁷

In 2011 the Commission revised the GAM and added the component *mobility*. The Commission explained that mobility '*is a broader concept than migration*' which better reflects its intention to improve the regular circulation of foreign nationals who may want to visit the EU for short periods (students, visitors, business persons or family members).¹⁸

13 Council of the European Union (2011), *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*, SEC (2011) 1353.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Council of the European Union (2005), *Presidency Conclusions*, 15914/1/05.

17 European Commission (2011), *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*, COM (2011) 743.

18 Ibid.

**BOX 1:
a legal obligation**

In the 2005 European Consensus on Development, the EU made the political commitment to enhance PCD, meaning that the EU has to take account of the interests of developing countries in all its policies.

Under the Lisbon Treaty (2007), this commitment has received a legal basis. Article 21 of the Treaty states that:

‘THE UNION SHALL ENSURE CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT AREAS OF ITS EXTERNAL ACTION AND BETWEEN THESE AND ITS OTHER POLICIES. THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION, ASSISTED BY THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY, SHALL ENSURE THAT CONSISTENCY AND COOPERATE TO THAT EFFECT’.

Moreover, Article 208 on the functioning of the EU, it is stated that:

‘THE UNION DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLICY SHALL HAVE AS ITS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE THE REDUCTION AND, IN THE LONG TERM, ERADICATION OF POVERTY. THE UNION SHALL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE POLICIES THAT IT IMPLEMENTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO AFFECT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’.

The Global Approach for Migration and Mobility (GAMM) focuses on four priority areas:

- Enhancing regular migration and facilitating mobility;
- Preventing and combatting irregular migration and human traffic;
- Maximising the development impact of migration and mobility;
- Promoting international protection.

In the context of the GAMM, the EU is running a broad dialogue with Africa on migration and mobility at all levels (bilateral, regional and continental).¹⁹ This dialogue is implemented through several instruments (political and legal), but also through operational support, capacity building and supporting programmes and projects. By enabling deeper and tailor-made dialogue and cooperation (on bilateral level), the EC initiated two specific cooperation frameworks: Mobility Partnerships and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs). Mobility Partnerships aim to establish a cooperation framework combined with visa facilitation and readmission agreements. The Partnerships are negotiated with countries in the European neighbourhood. CAMMs aim to establish a lighter cooperation framework and are open to priority countries outside the EU neighbourhood region.²⁰

3.3 THE NEW CONCEPT OF MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS

Based on earlier Commission initiatives, and in addition to the EU efforts in fighting irregular migration, the Mobility Partnerships can be used for new ways to improve regular movements between the EU and third countries; especially those countries that are ready to make significant efforts to fight irregular migration. Furthermore, Mobility Partnerships can be used to create ways to facilitate circular migration. The idea is that circular migration helps EU member states to fill their labour needs and exploit potential positive impacts of migration on development. For example, through skill transfers and of mitigating the impact of brain drain.²¹ Third countries are eligible for such a Mobility Partnership if they ensure the geographical balance between Eastern Europe and Africa. Partner countries have to host important migration flows from or through the country to the EU. They have to be ready to cooperate on readmission and fight against irregular migration. Finally, the concern of a Mobility Partnership should also lie with the interests of EU member states in cooperating with the country in question and the partner country's interest in such a Partnership.²²

¹⁹ European Commission, Africa, via http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/africa/index_en.htm [accessed 22 May 2015].

²⁰ European Commission (2013), EU 2013 report on Policy Coherence for Development, p. 132.

²¹ Ibid.

²² The Council of the European Union (2009), Mobility Partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration SEC (2009) 1240.

Mobility Partnerships: What do they imply?

Mobility Partnerships have the form of political declarations and are signed between the EU, participating member states, and the respective partner countries. EU member states can join on a voluntary basis. Once signed, the Mobility Partnerships remain open for other interested EU member states. The idea is that the particular partner country makes certain commitments for fighting irregular migration. In return they can expect improved regular migration and mobility opportunities to the EU for nationals of the partner country. Furthermore, the EC and participating member states can offer assistance to third countries. For example, they can guide in the development of their capacity to manage regular migration flows, help measure the risk of brain drain, promote circular migration or return migration, and improve procedures for issuing short stay visas to nationals of the third country.²³

Mobility Partnerships are tailor-made, but from a starting point they contain three chapters: 1) mobility, legal migration and integration; 2) migration and development; and 3) border management, identity and travel documents, fight against irregular migration and human trafficking.²⁴ A closer look at the intended content of the Mobility Partnerships reveals a predominance of migration control elements and a near absence of development goals.²⁵ Starting with the commitments expected from third countries for establishing a Mobility Partnership, the Commission's Communication on the Mobility Partnerships issues commitment on inter alia readmission, the fight against irregular migration, and the improvement of border control. Only two of the expected commitments can be seen as potentially contributing to development. These are the promotion of productive employment and decent work in the country of origin, and the improvement of regular migration opportunities for third country nationals.²⁶ On the contrary, the EC and the participating member states are free to execute one or all of the expected commitments. Thereby, the potential improvement of regular migration opportunities for Mobility Partnership countries' nationals is directly limited by the fact that the Mobility Partnerships respect the principle of the EU's preference for EU labour above labour from third countries.²⁷ This means that the EU first draws the necessary labour from its own labour sources before it derives labour from Mobility Partnership countries.

However, perhaps the most restrictive limitation is reflected in the non-existence of a financial support structure. This means that the participating EU member states are responsible for the funding of the projects taking place in the framework

23 European Commission (2007), On circular migration and mobility Partnerships between the European Union and third countries, COM (2007) 248.

24 Council of the European Union (2008), Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde, 9460/08.

25 Sandra Lavenex & Rahel Kunz (2008), 'The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations', *Journal of European Integration*.

26 European Commission (2007), On circular migration and Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and third countries, COM (2007) 248.

27 Sandra Lavenex & Rahel Kunz (2008), 'The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations', *Journal of European Integration*.

of the Mobility Partnership. Member states can appeal for the Commission's Thematic Programme for Cooperation with Third Countries in the Areas of Migration and Asylum (which aims to assist third countries in managing migration flows). The Commission adopts an annual action programme for the Thematic Programme and issues a call for proposals on this basis.²⁸ Despite the existence of this Thematic Programme, one can imagine that the non-existence of a specific budget hampers member states' active involvement in the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships. Thereby, practice showed that Mobility Partnership projects have mainly been funded by development actors. This would presumably mean that the Partnerships do fall under the development agenda, which contrasts the fact that the Partnerships fall under EU external migration policies.

In 2008 the first two pilot Partnerships were concluded with the Republic of Moldova and Cape Verde. After a certain pilot phase, the concept of the Mobility Partnership was upgraded to a principal framework for cooperation in the area of migration and mobility between the EU and its partners in the EU neighbourhood. Other Mobility Partnerships followed in 2009 (Georgia), 2011 (Armenia), 2013 (Morocco, Azerbaijan), and 2014 (Tunisia, Jordan). The joint declaration on a Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde was the first cooperation of this kind between the EU and an African state. For the time being, it was the only Mobility Partnership concluded with a Sub-Saharan state.²⁹ Negotiations with Senegal were started in 2008, but they have been stalled and have not progressed since. Negotiations with Ghana have continued since 2010.³⁰

The EU and Africa agreed to advance regular migration and mobility by better organising regular migration and fostering well-managed mobility between and within the continents, during the most recent EU-Africa summit in 2014.³¹ But the Mobility Partnerships have not been mentioned at all as possible instruments to facilitate this better organisation of regular migration and mobility. It seems that since the concept was initiated, the Mobility Partnership increasingly became a bilateral framework for EU neighbouring countries. It became bilateral, because Sub-Saharan African countries often do not fulfil the eligibility criteria, nor are aware of the added value of the Partnerships; therefore they lack enthusiasm and motivation to become a partner country in a Mobility Partnership.³²

28 Natasja Reslow (2010), *The Mobility Partnership*, Policy brief.

29 European Commission, Africa, via: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/africa/index_en.htm [accessed 22 May 2015].

30 Natasja Reslow (2012), *The Mobility Partnerships*, European Policy Debate.

31 EU-Africa Summit (2014), *EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility*.

32 Natasja Reslow (2012), *The Mobility Partnerships*, European Policy Debate.

Mobility Partnership in context?

On Commission level, the concept of Mobility Partnerships is perceived as positive. According to the Commissions 2013 report on Policy Coherence for Development³³, the Mobility Partnerships have proved to be highly useful tools for strengthening PCD. They have been helpful because they provide platforms of cooperation between the EU, its member states and the partner countries. Also, Council conclusions have referred to Mobility Partnerships as an essential element of the EU's GAMM. They can be seen as the centre of EU migration policies.³⁴ On the contrary, it appears that the political debate about the Mobility Partnerships is largely non-existent at the European level and the national level. A reason for this is that migration policies remain a domain mainly regulated by national policies. While the Mobility Partnerships are the centre of EU external migration policies, the Mobility Partnerships are only a fraction of the national migration policies. Since migration has increasingly been perceived as a European problem, it seems important to increase the role of the Mobility Partnerships in national migration policies.

3.4 CONCLUSION

In line with the Commissions Communications about the implication of the *migration-development nexus*, a successful migration policy requires a strong development perspective. Instead of approaching migration as something negative, the positive impact of migration on development in developing countries should be maximised. Within the scope of the *migration-development nexus* both the GAMM and the Mobility Partnerships intend to strengthen the link between migration and development. However, due to the limitations explained above and the lack of financial support structure in particular; the question remains whether the intentions lead to realisations. But before further judgement, the next chapter will first offer a closer look at Cape Verde: its general background, and the role of migration for the development of Cape Verde.

³³ European Commission (2013), EU 2013 Report on Policy Coherence for Development, p. 132.

³⁴ Natasja Reslow (2012), The Mobility Partnerships, European Policy Debate.



ABEL ALFREDO

sports teacher at the Escola Técnica Angel Estética in Praia, immigrant from Guinea Bissau, 49 years old

Influenced by many of his colleagues and attracted by the the higher salaries, Abel Alfredo left his home country Guinea Bissau for Cape Verde at the age of 24.

In Guinea Bissau he studied to become a sports teacher and had a job, but he decided to emigrate to Cape Verde. In Cape Verde, teachers get paid more than in Guinea Bissau. Even though living costs are higher, Mr. Alfredo 's salary has a higher value in his home country. This is beneficial for the remittances he sends home.

Initially, Mr. Alfredo saw Cape Verde as a transit to migrate to France. However, his opportunity to go to France disappeared when his aunt in France died. He then decided to stay in Cape Verde, where he has now lived for 25 years. *'I really enjoy living in Cape Verde, but Guinea Bissau remains my country, and therefore I plan to return after my retirement to enjoy my last years in his country of origin'.*

'I am convinced that my emigration to Cape Verde contributes to Cape Verde in the sense that I have already committed myself to the country for 25 years'. Moreover, Mr. Alfredo contributed to the development of Guinea Bissau. He contributes by the remittances he sends and by his participation in the Guinea Bissau Sports Teachers Association in Cape Verde. This association aims to support sport teachers in Guinea Bissau, and has for example established a school for sports teacher in Guinea Bissau.





4. MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN CAPE VERDE

'Si kabadu, ka ta biradu' - Eugenio Tavares

'You cannot return if you did not leave'. This text can be found on the monument that you will see when arriving on Nelson Mandela airport in Praia, the capital of Cape Verde. The monument commemorates Cape Verdean emigrants and reflects their important value to the country. Migration has long been vital for Cape Verde. As a result, migration became an inherent part of day-to-day life in Cape Verde and in the spirit of the Cape Verdean people.

This chapter elaborates on the synergy between migration and development in Cape Verde. It briefly provides a general background on Cape Verde in terms of history, economy and politics, before it enters into the link between migration and development.

4.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND OF CAPE VERDE

Cape Verde is an archipelago of volcanic origin, counting ten islands (nine inhabited) located around 500 km from the Senegalese coast, south of the Canary Islands. The country has a northern group of islands called Barlavento, including the islands of Boa Vista, Sal, Santa Luzia (uninhabited), Santo Antao, São Nicolau and São Vicente. The southern group of islands named Sotavento includes Brava, Fogo, Maio and Santiago.³⁵

History

When the Portuguese colonists António de Noli and Diogo Gomes arrived in Cape Verde between 1455 and 1461, they found inhabited islands. The Portuguese started exploiting the country and brought their own immigrants. Thus the islands became a centre in the slave trade between the African, European and American continents. This mix of Portuguese and various African entities then formed the foundation of the Cape Verdean society now. It was after the Portuguese abolition of slave trade in 1854 that Cape Verde's emigration trend started.

³⁵ Atlantico Business Development Rotterdam (2014), Kansen in de Agro-Business sector in Cabo Verde.

Cape Verdean emigration is commonly divided into three waves:

| 1900 - 1926 | 1927 - 1945 | 1946 - 1973 |
|--------------------------|---|--|
| Single-focused migration | Dispersion | Turn towards Europe |
| United States | 1. Latin America: Brazil and Argentina 2. Africa: Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tomé e Príncipe and Angola. 3. Portugal begins to stand out as a destination. | Countries like the Netherlands, France, Luxembourg, Italy and Switzerland. Alongside the United States, Spain and Angola, these countries remain main destination countries for Cape Verdean emigrants. |

Source: Migration Profile 2009.

Political context

The Republic of Cape Verde is a parliamentary democratic republic with no political prisoners and a clean human rights record. The oldest political party *Independence for Cape Verde Party* (PAICV) was the party that gained independence for the country in 1975. PAICV ruled Cape Verde as one-party state till a multiparty system was introduced in 1991. Since then, the political landscape has been dominated by the country's two major political parties: the left-hand oriented PAICV and the liberally oriented Movement for Democracy (MpD). The prime minister, *Jose Maria Neves* of the PAICV, took office in 2001. After that he was re-elected as prime minister in 2006 and 2011. Opposition leader *Jose Carlos Fonseca* of the Movement for Democracy (MpD) won the presidential elections in 2011.³⁶ Thus in 2011 it was the first time in the country's history that the prime minister and the president are from different political parties.

Economic context

The Cape Verde islands have few natural resources of their own. Agriculture is very difficult due to a lack of rain: raining an average of six to nineteen days per year which are only enjoyed by four islands: Fogo, Santiago, Santo Antão en São Nicolau.³⁷ Services dominate the economy, and about 82% of the country's food is imported;³⁸ this import mainly coming from the EU (export 94%, import 78%).³⁹ Due to these characteristics the Cape Verdean economy is largely dependent on the outside world. This is for example reflected in the trade volume with the EU. In 2010, Cape Verde exported €36 million compared to an import from €493 million. The country's most important trade partners are certain EU member states: Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain.⁴⁰ EU trade towards Cape Verde mainly covers industrial

products (77%) like redefined petroleum, planes, helicopters, cars etc. In return, Cape Verdean trade towards the EU covers mainly agro-food, including fisheries, meat, sugar, cocoa, coffee, and tea - but also textiles.⁴¹ It may come as a surprise that the Cape Verdean economy significantly improved throughout the years, despite the structural fragilities like a lack of natural resources, dry climate, and a fragmented market. The liberalisation of the economy in 1991 opened the private sector for investments and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This became a new and sizeable source of capital inflows by the late 1990s that has continued to grow and these external resources have enabled significant investments in all sectors.⁴²

Since 2005 tourism has increasingly become an important engine of growth for the economy. Due to the increase of FDI in tourism, the sector now covers 20% of national GDP (\$1.879 billion in 2013⁴³). In line with this growth, the number of tourists increased from 147.000 in 2000 to 3,436 million in 2013.⁴⁴

Up to 2010 the GDP experienced a strong growth with an annual average of 6% in the period 1991-2010.⁴⁵ In line, the GDP per capita increased from US \$ 902 in 1990 to US \$ 3,470 in 2012.⁴⁶ However, in the last years the GDP growth dropped to an annual growth of 3 to 4%. This upward trend was recognized by the international community as well. In 2008 Cape Verde was upgraded from the status of Least Developed Country to that of Middle Income Country.

Despite these significant improvements in the economic field, the Cape Verdean economy has been affected by the European crisis. The first effects were felt due to a reduction in FDI (since 2009). More recent afflictions came through reductions in exports of goods, Official Development Assistance (ODA), and deceleration of migrants' remittances for family support.⁴⁷

On top of that, it appears that the distribution of the benefits of economic growth has been uneven, that unemployment has remained a problem, and that relative poverty tends to increase. According to earlier results of the National Institute for Statistics of Cape Verde (INECV), unemployment rates rose from 8.6% in 2000 to 10.7% in 2010. The report *Estatísticas das migrações 2013* shows that unemployment even increased from 12.2% in 2011 to 16.8% in 2012 among regional disparities.⁴⁸

³⁶ Heritage Foundation (2015), 2015 Index of Economic Freedom.

³⁷ Atlantico Business Development Rotterdam (2014), Kansen in de Agro-Business sector in Cabo Verde.

³⁸ Heritage Foundation (2015), 2015 Index of Economic Freedom.

³⁹ European Commission (09-12-2011), Cape Verde secures access to EU markets and boosts its development.

Via: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=763> [accessed 1 April 2015].

⁴⁰ Atlantico Business Development Rotterdam (2014), Kansen in de Agro-Business sector in Cabo Verde.

⁴¹ European Commission (09-12-2011), Cape Verde secures access to EU markets and boosts its development. Via: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=763> [accessed 1 April 2015].

⁴² African Development Bank (2012), Cape Verde: A success story.

⁴³ The World Bank (2015), Data Cabo Verde. Via: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/cape-verde> [accessed 25 March 2015].

⁴⁴ Instituto Nacional de Estatística de Cabo Verde (2014), Estatísticas das migrações 2013.


⁴⁵ African Development Bank (2012), Cape Verde: A success story.

⁴⁶ Instituto Nacional de Estatística de Cabo Verde (2014), Estatísticas das migrações 2013.

⁴⁷ Banco de Cabo Verde (2012), Annual report 2012.

Cape Verde in the region

Cape Verde is widely recognised for its good governance in Africa. Out of 52 countries it has received the second-highest ranking for governance performance in the 2012 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). Also in economic terms, Cape Verde stands out for its high GDP. The country's GDP per capita is structurally higher than those of the countries on the African continent, and in the West African region (See figure below).



Though Cape Verde is officially seen as part of the African continent, ties with the continent are minimal: Portuguese rulers have always emphasized the Portuguese (and European) roots of the Cape Verdean people. In 1975 integration with the continent started when Cape Verde became a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, as a member of ECOWAS, Cape Verde's general level of participation in ECOWAS institutions remains low. The volume of trade between Cape Verde and other ECOWAS countries is insignificant (about 0.1% of Cape Verde's total trade).⁴⁸

48 Instituto Nacional de Estatística de Cabo Verde (2014), Estatísticas das migrações 2013.

49 African Development Bank (2012), Cape Verde: A success story.

4.2 THE LINK BETWEEN MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN CAPE VERDE

Cape Verde has a strong emigration tradition. Economic factors such as droughts, famines, unemployment, lack of job and study opportunities, have prompted heavy emigration throughout the country's history. The idea of emigration as a strategy to achieve personal, family and social success is profoundly enrooted in the Cape Verdean society. It is estimated that Cape Verde's expatriate population is larger than its domestic population.⁵⁰

As is often the case with countries experiencing large emigration rates, Cape Verde has become dependent of its emigrants during the ages. Two of the country's three most important external financial flows - ODA, remittances and FDI - owe their existence to emigrants.

The most visible link between migration and development is found in different forms of emigrant remittances:⁵¹ financial-, social-, and human remittances. In 1975, when the country became independent from the Portuguese government, 50% of the population lived below the poverty line. Remittances from Cape Verdean emigrants have contributed significantly to the decline of poverty and inequalities. This has resulted in increasing wealth: in 2007 26.6% of the population lived below the poverty line.⁵² On this topic more recent data are unfortunately not available.

Financial remittances include formal remittances (10% of the GDP⁵³) and informal remittances (around 30 to 40% of formal remittances⁵⁴). Typical examples of informal remittances are *dromas*; these are drums full of goods, mostly cloths, to be sold by family on the local markets or the Toyota minivans, used for public transport purposes.

Social remittances are networks that facilitate flows of information, skills, and financial resources. These remittances essentially contribute to the promotion of education, health, housing, transportation etcetera. For example, Cape Verdean emigrants have transmitted the high value of education in Europe to Cape Verde, in this way contributing to a profound investment in education by the Cape Verdean government. Due to the knowledge they brought home, Cape Verde performs among the top in Africa in terms of education nowadays.⁵⁵

50 Heritage Foundation (2015), 2015 Index of Economic Freedom.

51 Remittances are broadly defined as cross-border person-to-person payments of relatively low value.

52 The World Bank (2015), Data Cabo Verde, via: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/cape-verde> [accessed 25 March 2015].

53 Atlantico Business Development (2014), Kansen in de Agro-Business sector in Cape Verde.

54 André Corsino Tolentino and all (2008), A Importância e o Impacto das remessas dos emigrantes em Portugal no Desenvolvimento de Cabo Verde.

55 African Development Bank (2012), Cape Verde: A success story.

Ever since their independence in 1975, successive Cape Verdean governments have tried to utilize the knowledge and expertise of the country's diaspora - **human remittances** - in for example the implementation of projects promoting the temporary return of qualified professionals to fill the skilled labour shortages in many strategic sectors.⁵⁶

Adding to the above, emigrant **investments, savings** and **cultural transmission** (ambassadorship) are implications of the synergy between migration and development. In 2007, emigrant investments contributed 35% of the total amount of FDI.⁵⁷ More recent data are unfortunately not available.

Migration and development on institutional level

The positive impact of emigration on Cape Verde's development can partly be explained by the strong affinity Cape Verdean emigrants have with their homeland. Additionally, successive governments have immediately been aware of the importance of Cape Verdeans abroad and have always been committed to maintain close socio-economic relations with the country's diaspora.⁵⁸

Since the country's independence Cape Verdean governments have recognized emigration as vital element to the country. In response, governments have developed good relations with EU governments hosting large Cape Verdean communities. Thereby, several institutions have been created in Cape Verde to strengthen the link between emigration and the development of the country. In 2010 the establishment of a Ministry for Communities (MDC) raised emigration to the institutional level⁵⁹, and four years later the Ministry published the country's first National Strategy on Emigration and Development (ENED).⁶⁰

Immigration

Besides the fact that Cape Verde is a country of emigration, since the 1990's immigration rates have increased.⁶¹ In 2013 the National Institute for Statistics report *Estatísticas das migrações* estimates the immigration population about 3.5% of the total population. African countries are the main providers of immigrants: 38% from ECOWAS countries and 34% from other African countries.⁶²

⁵⁶ International Organisation for Migration, Cape Verde, via: <http://www.iom-nederland.nl/en/cape-verde> [accessed 2 April 2015].

⁵⁷ Jorgen Carling (2008), Policy Challenges Facing Cape Verde in the Areas of Migration and Diaspora Contributions to Development.

⁵⁸ African Development Bank (2012), Cape Verde: A success story.

⁵⁹ IOM (2009), Migration Profile for Cape Verde.

⁶⁰ Ministry for Communities (2014), Estratègia Nacional de Emigraço e Desenvolvimento.

⁶¹ IOM (2009) Migration Profile for Cape Verde.

⁶² Instituto Nacional de Estatística de Cabe Verde (2014), Estatísticas das migraçoes 2013.



4.3 CONCLUSION

Cape Verde has been a democratic and politically stable Middle Income Country and has shown steady economic growth rates over the past decades. The role between migration and the development of Cape Verde is undeniable: remittances and FDI are very important for the country. The Cape Verdean government has caught on to these ideas, thus the synergy between migration and development is institutionally and politically assured. However, Cape Verde's economy being very dependent upon the EU, the EU crisis is certainly noticeable on the economic performance of the country. Besides Cape Verde is increasingly being faced with immigration flows itself. Against the backdrop of these developments the EU and Cape Verde signed a Mobility Partnership, in the next chapter the Mobility Partnership is being analysed; what is in it for whom?

BOX 2:

The Republic of Cape Verde

- **DATE OF INDEPENDENCE: 5 JULY 1975**
- **PRESIDENT: JORGE CARLOS FONSECA**
- **INHABITANTS: 0.5 MILLION**
- **GDP PER CAPITA: \$ 3.470**
- **ANNUAL ECONOMIC GROWTH: 2.5%**
- **PUBLIC DEBT: 95.0% OF GDP**
- **POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LINE: 25%**
- **LIFE EXPECTANCY: 75.1 YEARS**

Human Development Report, Estatísticas das Migrações 2013 (National Institute for Statistics of Cape Verde), Census 2010 (National Institute for Statistics of Cape Verde), Economic Index Cape Verde (World Bank)



ANGELA GOMES

director of Gomes M&C, temporary migrant from the Netherlands, 29 years old

Inspired by her brother, Angela Gomes worked on digital education in Cape Verde via the Dutch TRQN III programme for almost a year.

Angela was born and raised in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Her parents emigrated to Rotterdam to give their children a better educational perspective than they would have had in Cape Verde. Her temporary return to Cape Verde had all to do with sharing her knowledge and skills on IT tools within the school systems. Cape Verde has a lot to offer when it comes to human capital, but especially digital inclusion is an important missing link. *'I was convinced to temporary return to Cape Verde by the idea of creating environments wherein students and teachers get the opportunity to broaden their views and get connected with a limitless world'.*

Angela sees the contribution of her digital education project to the development of Cape Verde first of all in short term effects: *'The learned digital instruments are being used and implemented in the classrooms, with the result that students learn more about the world and get stimulated in order to develop their capabilities'.* She explains that the long-term effects are linked to the slow but steady change of the school system in Cape Verde. As the traditional teaching method is being evaluated, steps are being taken by schools and the authorities to change the traditional teaching methods and adapt to the innovative teaching methods.

5. THE EU MOBILITY PARTNERSHIP WITH CAPE VERDE; WHAT IS IN IT FOR WHOM?

Mobility plays a key role in the society and economy in developing countries like Cape Verde. Eduardo Silva, former Coordinator of the Executive Secretary of the Special Partnership at the Ministry for External Relations (MIREX) explains: *'Mobility is not just a survival mechanism; it is also the key to the development of the country. Because of the large dependency of the Cape Verdean market, as well as the incapacity of the labour market to host all its supply, Cape Verde has to focus on the export of services, particularly services in the field of human resources and organisational skills. Therefore, the country needs to develop its software sector and educate capable Cape Verdeans that can easily integrate into other markets.'* He stresses the importance of mobility for Cape Verde. In order to facilitate this process, Eduardo Silva attributes a very important role to the Partnership: *'Right now, the EU Mobility Partnership is the best instrument that Cape Verde has to achieve this mobility for development'*.

In November 2007 the EU and Cape Verde signed a Special Partnership. As part of the stability and security pillar of this Special Partnership, the EU Mobility Partnership was signed six months later on 21 May 2008. Participating EU member states are Spain, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and later also the Netherlands.

Based on interviews with a variety of stakeholders in Cape Verde (note that not all of them are quoted), this chapter focuses on Cape Verde's Mobility Partnership. What were the motives to sign the Partnership? How does the implementation work? And what have the results been up to now? In short, what is in it for whom?

5.1 MOTIVATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

According to the Commission's Communication *Mobility Partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration*⁶³, the eligibility of Cape Verde was confirmed by the European Council. In the communication a formal written expression of interest from Cape Verde was absent. Cape Verde's geographical position in the Atlantic is very appealing from EU security perspectives. Next to that Cape Verde has always lain along the migration route towards the European Union and was *'ready to make significant efforts to fight irregular migration'*.⁶⁴ Thus, closer cooperation with Cape Verde in the field of migration offered a possibility to

⁶⁴ European Commission (2007), On circular migration and mobility Partnerships between the European Union and third countries, COM (2007) 248.

⁶³ Council of the European Union (2009), *Mobility Partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration*, SEC (2009) 1240.

contribute to the EU's fight against irregular migration, human and drug trafficking, and international terrorism. As Ewa Tomaszewska, Chargée d'Affaires of the EU Delegation in Praia, explains: *'Cape Verde's manageable scale was a factor considered in trying out the new concept of EU Mobility Partnerships with Cape Verde, which is an archipelago with reliable standards of border control, reasonable income levels (Middle Income Country) and characterized by mostly regular migration flows'*.

In contradiction to the strategic perspectives of the EU, Cape Verde expected the Mobility Partnership to meet its needs for a regular mobility framework and the development of schemes for managed labour migration and mobility on temporary or circular base. Victor Borges was responsible for the negotiations about the Mobility Partnership, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, and Communities from April 2004 till June 2008. With the Mobility Partnership he aimed to increase the mobility of Cape Verdean workers towards the EU in a scheme of regulated migration. *'I was convinced it would be a good thing for Cape Verdean migrants, for Cape Verde and for host countries. Unemployment (17.8% in 2008⁶⁵) was, and still remains, one of the major challenges of Cape Verde. The Mobility Partnership could counteract the high unemployment, and its negative social effects. Furthermore, the increased mobility would have a huge impact on the remittances flows, which in turn could create more jobs in Cape Verde'*.

5.2 THE MOBILITY PARTNERSHIP IN PRACTICE

In the form of a political declaration, the Mobility Partnership gives substance to a common intention to develop a dialogue and cooperation on migration issues for Cape Verde, the EC and EU member states Portugal, France, Spain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The Mobility Partnership exists of two legal binding elements: the visa facilitation agreement and the readmission agreement and is annexed with activities proposed on voluntary base by Cape Verde, the participating EU member states or the EC.⁶⁶

When signed, the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde contained 31 proposed projects. As far as known, this number increased up to the current status of 35 proposed activities. These activities are mainly bilateral projects and primarily focused on strengthening Cape Verde's migration management tools to implement both Mobility Partnership agreements.

⁶⁵ Employment and Vocational Training Institute Cape Verde (2008), Socioeconomic Survey.
⁶⁶ Natasja Reslow (2012), EU Migration cooperation with Cape Verde, Migration policy brief.

Implementation process

In Cape Verde, the Ministry for External Relations (MIREX) is the representative towards the country's international partners. Thus MIREX is seen as the leading party in the EU Mobility Partnership in Cape Verde. The Ministry is responsible for the coordination of the implementation of the Partnership, whereupon the implementation is done by a diverse scope of implementation partners: the Ministry for Communities (MDC), the National Institute for Statistics of Cape Verde (INECV), the Agency for the Development of Enterprises and Innovation (ADEI), and others. In the context of this coordinating role, the MIREX created an informal unit that once in a while brings together these relevant implementation partners. Maria Goretti Lima, Coordinator of the Executive Secretary of the Special Partnership of the MIREX, illustrates that *'only in the context of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements, the informal unit has been meeting frequently to monitor the implementation of these agreements on 1 December 2014'*. Next to supporting the implementation of the agreements, this informal unit also provides opportunities for the implementation partners to elaborate their project proposals, which they want to implement in the framework of the Mobility Partnership.

As was mentioned earlier, the EU Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde does not have a financial support structure. This means that the participating EU member states are financially responsible for the implementation of the Partnership. Thus without their own support structure, Cape Verde is dependent upon the financial means and the good will of its EU partners. Here, one can imagine the counteracting influence of the European economic crisis on the progress of the Partnership and its financial dependence.

5.3 RESULTS

Despite the absence of a specific budget, numerous Mobility Partnership activities have taken place in the years from 2008 until now. In contrast to the open communication about the EU Mobility Partnership with Moldova, there is no documentation available about Cape Verde's Mobility Partnership. Based on interviews with representatives of Mobility Partnership projects, the section below issues the results up to now, structured according to the four chapters of the Mobility Partnership.

Mobility, legal migration and integration

The Mobility Partnership chapter 'Mobility, legal migration and integration' focuses on regular migration and includes five intentions: 1) promote a better framework for legal mobility; 2) establish pre-departure campaign; 3) strengthening migration management; 4) improve social protection of legal migrants; and 5) develop a short-stay visa scheme.

Major projects, worth naming in the context of this chapter, were the establishment of an Information Centre on legal migration and promotion of reintegration into the Cape Verdean labour market (CAMPO) and the opening of an EU Common Visa Centre (CVC); opening in May 2010 in order to improve the visa application process for EU short-term visas. The EU CVC in Praia is one of the three EU CVC's in the world (others are in Moldova and Congo). João Ricardo Mendes, Consular Attaché of the Portuguese Embassy in Praia and responsible for running the Centre, explains that *'the CVC facilitates short-term mobility between Cape Verde and the EU, with a huge benefit of controlling migration and detecting irregular migration'*. According to João Ricardo Mendes, *'short-term mobility from Cape Verde to the EU has increased since the establishment of the CVC. In 2014, the CVC received 14.000 visa requests, whereof 10.000 visas were accepted'*. These requests are compared to 12.000 in 2013 and 10.000 in 2010. However, it is unknown how many of these requests were approved, because official data about short-term mobility between Cape Verde and the EU is not available.

Furthermore, a **visa facilitation agreement** was signed on the 26th of October 2011, and entered into force three years later on 1 December 2014. The agreement aims to make it easier and cheaper for Cape Verdean citizens (in particular those who travel often) to acquire short-stay visas, which allow them to travel freely to and throughout the EU. A short-stay visa is a visa for an intended stay of no more than 90 days per period of 180 days. The visa facilitation agreement has to ensure the exemption of visas to holders of diplomatic and state passports. The agreement has to provide access to visas with a validity up to five years to various categories of people: officials, employees in state missions, artists, sportsmen, journalists, NGO representatives, religious representatives, students, teachers, and relatives.⁶⁷ Alice Santos, Director for Consular Affairs and Treaties of the MIREX and the person responsible for the implementation of the Mobility Partnership, sees the visa facilitation agreement as one of the major results of the Partnership for Cape Verde. She explains: *'The Partnership improved the short-term mobility of particular categories of people in Cape Verde. In line, the Mobility Partnership brought a certain feeling of freedom of movement for some as well as it improved the exchange of knowledge between Cape Verde and the EU. For example, the mobility of Cape Verdean journalists between Cape Verde and the EU contributed essentially to the development of critical thinking capacities in Cape Verde'*.

Arnaldo Andrade Ramos, Member of Parliament on behalf of the *Independence for Cape Verde Party*, emphasizes the importance of the visa facilitation agreement for Cape Verde: *'It is all about the category of relatives. The relatives' category concerns everybody who has family ties to the EU, which technically are almost all Cape Verdeans'*.

⁶⁷ European Commission (2012). EU-Cape Verde agreement on facilitating the issuing of short-stay visas, Press release.



However, mobility between the EU and Cape Verde for Cape Verdean citizens remains very difficult in practice. Alice Santos admits that *'for the majority of the Cape Verdeans this mobility is still very far away'*. João Osvaldo Carvalho, General Inspector for Labour notes that *'in practice, the Mobility Partnership facilitates the mobility of specific categories of people that were already in the best position to get a visa before the Mobility Partnership was signed. The only difference is that it is now written on paper'*. Also Francisco Carvalho, General Director of the Ministry for Communities, confirms that *'the people that nowadays get a visa are the same people that also were in the best position to get a visa before the Mobility Partnership was signed'*.

The visa facilitation agreement aimed to improve the short-term mobility of Cape Verdean nationals. The mobility was seen as necessary in context of Cape Verde's high economic fragility and focus on the development of a profound service sector. Almost all interviewees identified the exchange of knowledge and expertise with institutions, organisations and companies in EU member states as essential. According to some interviewees, short-term mobility towards the EU has improved, however, according to others mobility is still far away for the majority of the Cape Verdeans. Available data appears to be non-existent, and it seems important that mobility related data is released soon. By obtaining this data it is possible to form more correct conclusions about the mobility between Cape Verde and the EU. However, as turns out from the last interviewees, the agreement does not tackle the gap between the Cape Verdean need for more regular mobility opportunities (to develop a profound service sector) and the need to enhance economic cooperation.

Migration and development

As was discussed in chapter 4, the Cape Verdean diaspora play a big part in the development process of Cape Verde. Thus, the Mobility Partnership chapter 'migration and development' mainly focuses on the role of the diaspora and includes three intentions: 1) strengthening the links with the diaspora; 2) temporary migration; and 3) voluntary return and reintegration of returning migrants.

One of the more important projects within this Mobility Partnership chapter- *Diaspora for the Development of Cape Verde (DIAS De Cabo Verde)*- has promoted and reinforced the ties between members of the diaspora and the public and private sectors both in Cape Verde and Europe, while contributing to the strengthening of transnational linkages of the Cape Verdean diasporas in Portugal, Italy and the Netherlands.⁶⁸ This was done through the matching of professional needs in priority sectors in the origin country with available competences and skills in countries of the diaspora. Additionally, the project promoted migrant entrepreneurship in the origin country, particularly in the constitution of entrepreneurial Partnerships and the creation of business projects.

⁶⁸ European Commission (2014), Report on the implementation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 2012-2013.

One should take into account that Cape Verde, as emigration country, already addressed the engagement of its diaspora long before the EU Mobility Partnership entered into force. The Mobility Partnership could serve as a good instrument to further improve this engagement. *DIAS De Cabo Verde* made a start in utilizing the Mobility Partnership for Cape Verde's development.

Despite the efforts of the former project, a closer look at all the Mobility Partnership activities shows a significant focus on migration management. The subject of migration and development is included as one of the three chapters of the Mobility Partnership and is one of the four pillars of the GAMM. Nevertheless, the development impact of migration should be better elaborated in the Mobility Partnership.

Diaspora engagement

So it seems that much more can be done to maximise the positive impact of emigration on Cape Verde's development. For example, the creation of a digital platform for Cape Verdean diaspora, the development cooperation donors, private sector enterprises, and public institutions (inspired by the EU Mobility Partnership with Moldova) might have potential. In line with the Ministry for Communities, such a communication platform could provide emigrants with products and services that support successful circular deployment of the Cape Verdean diaspora in Cape Verde. A great example of this kind of effort are projects in which diaspora frequently reciprocate between their new home country and Cape Verde to fill professional gaps in their country of origin.

Here, another related aspect is the permanent return of Cape Verdean emigrants to Cape Verde. As Emanuel Alberto Duarte Barbosa, MpD representative of Cape Verdean diaspora in Europe within the Cape Verdean parliament, suggested that such an online platform could also help these re-immigrated diaspora members with their reintegration into the Cape Verdean labour market and with their reintegration in the Cape Verdean society (housing and social security system). Additionally, this online platform could also inform Cape Verdean citizens abroad on labour market possibilities in Cape Verde and bring together employers and Cape Verdeans abroad.

Furthermore, Emanuel Barbosa sees possibilities in improving Cape Verde's business climate. A better business climate will attract more emigrant investments. His counterpart of the *Independence for Cape Verde Party*, Arnaldo Andrade Ramos, adds that: *'the Mobility Partnership should be used to link mobility to business and investment in order to improve economic mobility between Cape Verde and the EU'*. An increased economic cooperation between the EU and partner countries will enhance economic development in these partner countries. It can be said that the engagement of diaspora in Cape Verdean tourism should be further elaborated.

A closer look at Cape Verde's Mobility Partnership projects shows a large absence of these suggestions. Remittances are non-existent in the implementation of the Partnership, which is odd as they can be seen as very important external financial flow and as the most visible link between migration and development. Neither does the Mobility Partnership address the further development of Cape Verde's human capital through for example: the reform of education, training and labour market systems. Finally, the Partnership does not provide a role for the Cape Verdean civil society, as general watchdog of the development agenda. Mario Moniz, Executive Secretary of the NGO platform in Cape Verde illustrates: *'the civil society has not been involved in the Mobility Partnership thus far. The involvement of the civil society is necessary to make the Mobility Partnership an instrument for the development of Cape Verde'*.

However, there is hope for improvement in the near future. Current Coordinator of the Executive Secretary of the Special Partnership, Maria Goretti Lima, explicitly underlines the importance of the development aspect of the Mobility Partnership by taking into consideration the prevailing main focus upon strengthening migration management: *'Fortunately, I have noticed increased attention to this development aspect in the recent MIREX informal unit meetings about the implementation of the Mobility Partnership. Therefore, we are currently working on elaborating ideas about how to include Cape Verdean communities and diaspora organisations abroad in facilitating mobility and the Mobility Partnership'*.

Border management, identity and travel documents, fight against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings

The Mobility Partnership chapter 'Border management, identity and travel documents, fight against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings' focuses on the commitment to readmission and the fight against irregular migration. It turns out that EU member states' interests in the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde mainly lie in developing cooperation on border management with a view to preventing and reducing irregular migration.⁶⁹ Several initiatives also aim at capacity building in the area of document security or counteracting human trafficking.

Important projects have addressed the securitisation of travel documents through the introduction of a biometric passport (SNIAC, National Identification and Civil Authentication System). These projects have also foreseen a working arrangement with Frontex, and this resulted in strengthening cooperation on border control.⁷⁰

Furthermore, a **readmission agreement** was signed on the 24th October 2014. It entered into force on 1 December 2014, simultaneously with the visa facilitation agreement. The readmission agreement proposes clear obligations and procedures for the authorities of EU member states and Cape Verde. For example the question of when and how to take back people who are irregularly residing on the territories of the EU and Cape Verde. Importantly, they not only cover the irregularly staying nationals of both parties, but also third country nationals and stateless persons that have a clear link with the requested party, the EU or Cape Verde (e.g. visa or resident permit).⁷¹

The readmission agreement can be identified as the most important judicial instrument of the Mobility Partnership for both the EU and Cape Verde. From the perspective of the EU, the readmission agreement is essential in its fight against irregular migration. It reflects the EU's attempt to link Mobility Partnerships with cooperation on readmission.⁷² For Cape Verde, the readmission agreement came along with the package of the Mobility Partnership. But as Ewa Tomaszewska explains: *'the readmission agreement was quite controversial in Cape Verde. The country was afraid that a high amount of irregular Cape Verdeans would be deported to Cape Verde at once. Most Cape Verdeans stay legally in the EU, but this concern especially related to migrants that used Cape Verde as transit to the EU. With the readmission agreement, Cape Verde agreed to readmit also those who irregularly entered the EU via Cape Verde.'*

That is why Victor Borges, former minister of Foreign Affairs, Communities and Cooperation, in first instance refused to readmit irregular migrants from the ECOWAS region that entered EU territory via Cape Verde: *'Cape Verde was too fragile to take even more problems. I only wanted to readmit ECOWAS migrants that legally resided in Cape Verde'*. However, Cape Verde's high dependency of the EU (in terms of trade, ODA and FDI) played a decisive role in signing the readmission agreement.

This chapter clearly focuses on the EU's interest to combat irregular immigration and lacks any approach to maximise the development impact of Cape Verde's emigration. Furthermore, this chapter issues Cape Verde's commitment in turn for the so-called improvement of regular migration opportunities. As illustrated by the interviewees, Cape Verde appears to lack sufficient capacity and eagerness or reluctance to successfully implement a readmission agreement and tackle irregular migration flows. However, according to the information of the EU Delegation in Praia, there has been no single case of readmission registered since the 1st of December 2014 (the date of entry into force) until 26 May 2015.

Asylum and immigration

In order to improve Cape Verde's capacity of tackling immigration flows, the chapter 'Asylum and immigration' was later incorporated in the Mobility Partnership.

Significant projects, like the elaboration of a National Strategy for Immigration, contributed to the development of a Cape Verdean immigration policy, which was non-existent before. Carmen Barros, Director of the Directorate General for Immigration (DGI), explains: *'Some of the concrete results of the Mobility Partnership contributed to Cape Verde in the sense the country now has more knowledge about immigration. However, these results can also contributed to the EU: a proper functioning immigration policy contributes to the objective of fighting against irregular migration, as well as a proper implementation of the readmission agreement'*.

Asylum and immigration are closely aligned to fighting irregular immigration. As illustrated by Carmem Barros, a proper functioning asylum and immigration policy in Cape Verde is essential in the EU's combat against irregular immigration. A fool proof immigration policy contributes to a decrease of irregular migration flows towards EU territory via Cape Verde. This chapter sadly lacks any approach to make migration work for Cape Verde's development.

⁶⁹ European Commission (2009), Mobility Partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration, 14489/09.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ European Commission (2012), EU-Cape Verde agreement on facilitating the issuing of short-stay visas.

⁷² Thanos Maroukis & Anna Triandafyllidou (2013), Mobility Partnerships: A convincing tool for the EU's global approach to Migration?.

5.4 CONCLUSION

A deeper dive into the reality of the Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde has revealed the imbalance the Mobility Partnership involves.

The EU's security perspective appears to be diametrically opposed to Cape Verde's perspective of development. Cape Verde remains highly dependent on the EU, despite the fact that Cape Verde and the EU signed a Special Partnership in 2007 and a Mobility Partnership in 2008 that both boosted the EU-Cape Verdean relationship to a relationship of dialogue and policy convergence. As a result, EU interests dominate Cape Verdean interests. Whereas the Mobility Partnership was partly intended as a development tool, EU interests in the Mobility Partnership mainly lie in the EU's fight against irregular migration. In contrast, Cape Verdean interests lie in the improvement of regular mobility opportunities for Cape Verdean nationals in order to utilize mobility for the development of the country. The imbalance in both parties' interests can be seen as a translation of the imbalance between migration and development in the Mobility Partnership. A closer look into the Mobility Partnership shows that the Partnership only meets Cape Verde's needs to maximise the impact of migration on its development in a very limited way. The Partnership mainly focuses on strengthening Cape Verde's migration management. Circular mobility schemes for example, remain absent in the EU Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde, while this absence contradicts the Commission's intention to integrate the promotion of circular migration in the Mobility Partnerships.⁷³ Within this scope, it appears that the EU mainly uses the Partnership to make Cape Verde a partner in its fight against irregular migration, instead of using it as an instrument to implement its PCDD priority of making migration work for development.

⁷³ European Commission (2007), On circular migration and mobility Partnerships between the European Union and third countries, COM (2007) 248.





LUCIA DIAS

hairstylist and driving force behind the establishment of her mother's soap factory in Cape Verde, emigrant from Cape Verde, 39 years old

Lucia Dias has been motivated by her mother, who wanted to initiate something substantial for the Cape Verdean people. Thus, leading Dias to frequently travel between the Netherlands and Cape Verde to support her mother's soap factory in Fundura (Santiago Island).

Ms. Dias was born in Portugal from Cape Verdean parents. Her mother emigrated to Portugal while her father worked in the Dutch maritime sector in Rotterdam. Ms. Dias left Portugal for the Netherlands when she was 9 years old. In 2005, she visited Cape Verde for the first time: *'It felt like coming home. However, I don't have any aspirations to permanently move to Cape Verde.'*

Though her mother never wanted to return to Cape Verde, she changed her mind when she was forced to temporarily return to take care of her sick mother, Ms. Dias grandmother. When Ms. Dias's father retired, her parents remigrated to Cape Verde. *'My mother wanted to do something for the Cape Verdean population, so I helped her to establish a small soap factory.'* In the factory, they make soap from a local plant that grows everywhere. The production process and subsequently selling is supposed to contribute to the local community. One reason it might contribute is that they use as many local products as possible.

Supported by the Dutch TRQN III program, Ms. Dias trained 12 youngsters in the making of soap, and since last year the factory really functions. *'Despite the factory currently not being big enough to provide work for all youngsters that participated in the training, I believe that this training also contributed for an important part to the development of the creativity of the youngsters to find other ways of living.'* Ms. Dias explains that she tried to learn them to look for opportunities in Cape Verde. This contradicts their general opinion that opportunities always lie outside Cape Verde.

6. MAIN CONCLUSIONS: THE MOBILITY PARTNERSHIP AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT?

In response to the increasing urge for a solution to the migration crisis in the Mediterranean, this report addressed EU external migration policies. Within this scope, the EU Mobility Partnership is the most substantial instrument. This report analysed the development impact of these Partnerships using the case of Cape Verde. The concept of Mobility Partnerships was launched to improve regular migration with third countries and to create more coherence between EU migration and development policies.

However, when put into practice, an imbalance exists between actions on regular (labour) migration and actions addressing the flows of irregular migration in the Mobility Partnership.⁷⁴ More than that, fighting irregular migration towards EU territory has been a key element in Mobility Partnerships, like the Partnership with Cape Verde. First of all, Mobility Partnership partner countries, have to be geographically positioned along the migration routes towards the European Union and have to be *'ready to make significant efforts to fight irregular migration'*.⁷⁵ Secondly, a closer look at the Mobility Partnership projects shows a main focus on strengthening border control and migration management, and a remarkably low representation of development goals. Furthermore, the idea of the predominance of migration control elements is enhanced by the judicial agreements of the Partnership: the visa facilitation agreement and the readmission agreement.

Fighting irregular migration is in the benefit of the EU and has nearly nothing to do with maximising the impact of migration on the development of Cape Verde. Tools or activities to maximise the development impact of migration are largely absent in the EU Mobility Partnership. A good start has been made in strengthening the engagement of Cape Verdean diaspora; still major changes have to be made to turn the Partnership into an instrument for development.

Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) is one of the greatest challenges faced by the EU: the effects of its policies in developing countries are complex, and solutions require tough political decisions. The EU must nevertheless take responsibility for the effects of its migration policy on the development of countries like Cape Verde. Corrective action is necessary to ensure that EU Mobility Partnerships

⁷⁴ Thanos Maroukis & Anna Triandafyllidou (2013), *Mobility Partnerships: A convincing tool for the EU's global approach to Migration?*
⁷⁵ European Commission (2007), *On circular migration and mobility Partnerships between the European Union and partner countries*, COM (2007) 248.

address migration as an instrument for the development of partner countries and not only functions as an instrument to fight irregular migration.

Mobility is Cape Verde's best instrument for development. Considering this importance for countries like Cape Verde, regular migration deserves continued attention. So, if the EU determines the Mobility Partnerships as instrument to address the challenges deriving from migration, it should seriously focus on circular and temporary migration. Thus the EU should extend the possibilities of regular migration and mobility within the Partnerships. At the same time, the EU should initiate a financial support structure in order to improve the significance of the Partnership.

Secondly, the EU should recognise the importance of business and investment in the framework of the Mobility Partnership. A better connection between mobility, business, and investment could help improve economic cooperation between the EU and partner countries. The improvement in cooperation is expected to have a positive result for the economic development in these partner countries.

Thirdly, the Mobility Partnership seems to be a good instrument to improve the engagement of the diaspora in the development of partner countries. A start has been made in the case of Cape Verde. But the role of its diaspora and the communication with it needs to be further strengthened. The EU should also recognise the importance of remittances in the Partnership. A more significant role could positively strengthen economic empowerment of migrants' families.

Finally, the EU needs to invest more in dialogue and support mechanisms for civil society. The EU needs to aid governments in developing countries with EU policy, for example in negotiation processes about future Mobility Partnerships. This can assist in addressing the impact of EU policies on the development of partner countries. Within this scope, civil society's involvement in the implementation of the Mobility Partnership should be ensured in practical and institutional terms.

Reform of the concept of EU Mobility Partnerships is crucial. The EU must take its responsibility and ensure that the Mobility Partnership is not only an instrument to fight irregular migration, but also an instrument to utilize migration for development. In line with the call of the new EU Agenda on Migration, stronger political will and commitment at all levels in Member States and in Brussels are needed to ensure the realisation of the development impact of EU external migration policies. Here, a leading role applies for the new Commission's president, Jean-Claude Juncker. Immediately after taking office he identified the need for coherence between any Commission's proposals and sustainable development, an idea which is anchored in many EU treaties.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ European Commission (2014), *First Vice-President, in charge of Better Regulation, Interinstitutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights*.

7. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

EU member states should...

- Acknowledge that migration and the current crisis are a European wide issue, which needs to be addressed jointly by all member states sharing responsibility.
- Focus also on long term solutions in response to the current migration crisis and further discuss the opportunities of profound and well-managed regular mobility opportunities in the fight against irregular migration.
- Within the Council of Ministers ask the European Commission to reform the EU Mobility Partnerships in such a way they become an actual tool for development (not merely focused on border control and readmission) with a proper financial support structure.
- Explore ways to facilitate circular labour migration schemes with Mobility Partnership partner countries in order to help EU member states to address their labour needs while exploiting potential positive impacts of migration on development.

The European Commission should...

- Come up with a more profound EU migration policy which looks for more long term solutions to stop irregular migration and offer migrants a safe route to the EU in the form of circular and temporary migration.
- Reform the EU Mobility Partnerships, making them a strong tool for development and hereby facilitating safe migration routes to the EU, in the form of short term mobility for professional and educational purposes.
- Within the Mobility Partnerships make a stronger connection to education, business and investment opportunities.
- Recognise the importance of remittances in the framework of the Partnership.
- Invest more in dialogue and support mechanisms with civil society and governments in developing countries on how to turn the Mobility Partnerships into a stronger tool for development.

The European Parliament should...

- Question the European Commission and the European Council on the impact so far of the EU Mobility Partnerships in partner countries.
- Urge the European Commission to come up with more profound EU migration policy also proposing more long term solutions.
- Urge the European Commission to reform the Mobility Partnerships taking into account the above mentioned recommendations.

The Cape Verdean Ministry for External Relations should...

- Establish a permanent Working Group on the implementation of the Mobility Partnership.
- Ensure the involvement of civil society in the implementation of the Mobility Partnership.
- Promote the importance of a coherent migration and development agenda in the EU Mobility Partnership.
- Enhance openness about the Mobility Partnership process.

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ANNEX 2:

List of proposed projects in the framework of the EU Mobility Partnership in Cape Verde

| Proposing country | Project | State of play |
|--|---|---|
| Cape Verde and EU member states | Develop a dialogue on reintegration of migrants | Ongoing (except for France -covered by bilateral agreement) |
| Cape Verde and EU member states | Foster cooperation between hospitals and research institutions | Concluded |
| Cape Verde and Frontex | Cape Verdean national police should implement training programmes for border guards and on the falsification of documents | Concluded |
| Cape Verde and Frontex | Signing and implementation of operation agreement between Cape Verde and Frontex | Concluded |
| European Commission | Negotiate a visa facilitation agreement | Concluded |
| European Commission | Negotiate a readmission agreement | Concluded |
| European Commission and EU member states | Strengthening of Cape Verde's capacities in migration management | Concluded |
| European Commission and EU member states | Facilitate police cooperation | Not known |
| European Commission and EU member states | Develop national comprehensive migration policies | Concluded |
| EU member states | Foster cooperation between higher education institutions | Not known |
| France | Open up certain professions to Cape Verdean migrants (part of a bilateral agreement) | Concluded |
| France | Cooperate with Cape Verde on security and document control | Not known |
| France | A co-development programme | Concluded |
| Luxembourg | Offer twinning between universities | Not known |
| Luxembourg | Consider a circular migration scheme | Not known |
| Luxembourg | Strengthen the programme 'Migrer les yeux ouverts' | Concluded |
| Non Available (N/A) | Migration profile for Cape Verde | Concluded |
| N/A | Ratification of the Geneva Convention by Cape Verde | Concluded |

| | | |
|----------|--|---|
| N/A | Implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime by Cape Verde | Ongoing |
| N/A | Work agreement between Frontex and Cape Verdean national police should include information exchange and joint operational measures | Concluded |
| Portugal | Develop CAMPO (an information Ongoing centre for prospective Cape Verdean migrants) | Concluded, integrated in Ministry for Communities |
| Portugal | Sign a new protocol with Cape Verde to promote temporary and circular migration | Not known |
| Portugal | Cooperation between the Portuguese and Cape Verdean employment and vocational training institutes | Not known |
| Portugal | Set up a common visa application centre in Praia for short-term visas | Concluded |
| Portugal | Develop DIAS de Cabo Verde (foster circulation of highly qualified Cape Verdean migrants) | Concluded |
| Portugal | Support the Cape Verdean national health system | Ongoing |
| Portugal | Help Cape Verde develop its asylum system | Concluded |
| Portugal | Implementation of SNIAC (National Identity System) | Ongoing |
| Portugal | Information campaign to create awareness of the danger of processed human being | Concluded |
| Spain | Launch a schools/workshops programme | Not known |
| Spain | Strengthen the development of business initiatives by women | Concluded |
| Spain | Strengthen capacities of Cape Verdean national health system | Not known |
| Spain | Strengthening capacities of Cape Verdean public security institutions | Concluded |
| Spain | Strengthen the Cape Verdean national Red Cross | Concluded |
| Spain | Build capacity of Ministry of Defence | Not known |

ANNEX 3:

List of interviewees

| Name | Institution | Position |
|---------------------------------|--|----------------------|
| Barbosa Alberto Duarte, Emanuel | Movement for Democracy | Member of Parliament |
| Barros Furtado, Carmem | DGI | Director |
| Borges, Victor | MIREX | Former Minister |
| Cardoso, Eloisa | Organisation for Women in Cabo Verde | Project Manager |
| Carvalho Avelino, Francisco | MDC | General Director |
| De Carvalho Osvaldo, João | Ministry for Young, Employment and Development of Human Resources - DG for Labour and Employment | General Inspector |
| Den Besten, Astrid | Netherlands Embassy (Dakar) | Economic Attaché |
| Fernandes, Fernanda | MDC | Minister |
| Gomes, Angela | Gomes M&C | Director |
| Lima Goretti, Maria | MIREX - Executive Secretary for the Special Partnership | Coordinator |
| Lopes de Lurdes, Maria | INECV | Executive Officer |
| Medina, Paulo | MDC | Executive Manager |
| Mendes Ricardo, João | EU CVC | Coordinator |
| Moniz, Mario | Platform for NGO's | Executive Secretary |
| Moreno Estaline, Emanuel | Directorate for Foreigners and Borders | Director |
| Mulas, Virginia | Independent | Project Manager |
| Neves Ramos, Suely | International Organisation for Migration | Project Officer |
| Pais De Luís, Irina | Embassy of Portugal | Development Attaché |
| Parker Danso, Tony | Platform for African Communities | President |
| Ramos Andrade, Arnaldo | Independence for Cape Verde Party | Member of Parliament |
| Santos, Alice | MIREX - DG for Consular Affairs and Treaties | Executive Director |
| Silva Jorge, Eduardo | MIREX | Chief of Cabinet |

| | | |
|---------------------------|--|---------------------------|
| Silva Ascensão, Júlio | National Trade Union of Cape Verde | Secretary General |
| Sylva Charles, René | INECV | Executive Officer |
| Tavares, Frantz | ADEI | President |
| Tavares Martins, Raimundo | Ministry for Young, Employment and Development of Human Resources - DG for Labour and Employment | General Director |
| Tomaszewska, Ewa | EU Delegation in Praia | Chargé D'Affairs |
| Tolentino, André Corsino | MIREX/ Academy of Sciences and Humanities of Cape Verde | Ambassador/ Senior Fellow |
| Traoré, Djénéba | West Africa Institute | Director General |

